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LIFE INSURANCE AND SUICIDEHISTORY AND THE COLORADO STATUTE
By
I.

EDWARD MUIHR*

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this note is to examine Colo. Rev. Stat. 72-3-23,
a Colorado statute providing, in essence, that suicide shall be no
defense to the payment of a life insurance policy after the expiration of the first policy year.' To fully understand the problems
raised by this statute, and the difficulty in legislating such a matter,
it is necessary to examine generally the historical development of
suicide, particularly in relation to insurance.
II.

ENGLAND

England's policy on suicide was first created by the church.
Suicide violated church canon law and was originally under the
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.2 The church denied burial
rites to the suicide and this sanction was incorporated into the
Canon of King Edgar, 967. In addition, this canon provided for
forfeiture of the goods and lands of the suicide. 3 This was especially
important because it subsequently led to the idea that suicide was
a felony. At early common law a felon forfeited his goods and lands.
The law then reasoned in reverse that since a 4suicide also forfeits
his goods and lands, that act must be a felony.
Obviously there was more than this mechanical, backward reasoning to establish suicide as a felony. That something more is
found in the basic social and religious structure of early England.
Under the feudal system, a pyramidal land ownership structure was
created with the king as lord paramount. He granted parcels of land
to mesne lords, and they in turn granted the land to the tenant
paravail, the lowest tenant. In each case the person receiving land
was deemed to hold it under the person from whom he received it.
In exchange for receiving the land, the person owed a service of
some kind to the grantor. This service was more than a contractual
obligation and was so connected to the land as to be regarded as a
burden upon it.5 A tenant, by committing suicide and terminating
the service, deprived the lord of what amounted to a property right.
Property rights were strictly protected by the common law, and it
is not unreasonable to suppose that denial by suicide of the property
right the lord held in the services of the tenant was a significant
factor in establishing suicide as a felony.
* December 1963 graduate. University of Denver College of Law.
' Colo. Rev. Stat. § 72-3-23 (1953). Suicide no defense for nonpayment. - The suicide of a
policyholder after the first policy year of any life insurance policy issued by any life insurance
company doing business in this state, shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance
policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary, and whether said policyholder was sane
or insane. Nothing in this section contained is intended or shall be construed to apply to any accident
insurance policy insuring against accidental death or death by accidental means, or to those parts
or provisions of any life insurance policy which insure specifically against accidental death or death
by accidental means.
2 St. John-Stevos, Life, Death and the Law 233 (1961).
3 Id. at 234.

4 Ibid.

Moynihan, Preliminary Survey of the Law of Real Property 4 (Ist ed. 1940).
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England never enjoyed separation of church and state. The religious stand of the state church on suicide must have been influential in shaping England's legal attitudes toward that subject. Each
of the two state churches in English history, the Catholic church
and the Anglican church, have strongly condemned suicide.
The old case of Hales v. Petit states the rationale that supported
early England's condemnation of suicide., Suicide was declared an
offense against God, against nature and against the King:
(1) Against nature, because it is contrary to the rules
of self-preservation, which is the principle of nature, for
every thing living does by instinct of nature defend itself
from destruction, and then to destroy one's self is contrary
to nature, and a thing most horrible.
(2) Against God, in that it is a breach of His commandment, Thou shalt not kill; and to kill himself by which
act he kills in presumption his own soul, is a greater offense than to kill another.
(3) Against the King, in that hereby he has lost a subject, and . . . he being the head has lost one of his mystical
7
members.
England distinguished very early between a sane and an insane
suicide. Edgar's canon of 967, which imposed the first civil sanction
against suicide, recognized insanity as a defense to those sanctionss
60'Sullivan, The Ethics of Suicide, 2 Catholic Lawyer
1 Plow. 253, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (C.B. 1563).
7 Id., 1 Plow, at 261, 75 Eng. Rep. at 400.
8 St. John-Stevas, supra note 2 at 234.

147, 148, (1956),

citing Hales v. Petit,

WHEREDENVERSHOP$ WITHCONFIDENCE
DOWNTOWN

CHERRY CREEK

*

LAKESIDE

See Our New
XK-100 Suits
by KUPPENHEIMER
Here is a new slim silhouette. Here are wool worsted
fabrics that have all the lighthearted feeling of Spring.
Here are great new styles for the man who
must look his confident best. 115.00 to 125.00
Men's Shop: Downtown, Cherry Creek, Lakeside, Greeley

1964

LIFE INSURANCE -

SUICIDE

In 1870 England abolished forfeiture of the property of the suicide,
apparently in recognition of the futility and inequity of imposing a
sanction against the suicide or his estate.9 Suicide remains a crime
today in England, but the only penalty is denial of burial by 1the
Anglican church and avoidance of the suicide's life insurance. 0
The landmark English case concerning life insurance and suicide is Beresford v. Royal Insurance Co.," in which the insurance
policy provided that suicide of the insured shall be no defense if
committed more than one year after date of policy. The insured's
suicide occurred long after the first policy year and within a few
minutes of expiration of the policy. His personal representative
sued upon the policy but the English court denied recovery, pointing out that suicide is a crime in England and it violates public
policy to allow a person to profit from his own felony. The court
did not indicate the importance of motive in such a case, but it appears to be immaterial when considered in light of the old case of
Amicable Society v. Bolland.12 In that case the assignee of the insured's policy was denied recovery because the insured was executed for forgery, a crime totally unconnected with insurance.
Therefore, it appears that English law does not distinguish between
policies payable to the suicide's estate and those payable to third
party beneficiaries.
The treatment of suicide as a felony has established a fixed and
rigid public policy in England which leaves little room for litigation
regarding suicide and life insurance. This is pointed out by the fact
that England has few cases on the subject.
It is doubtful that the concept of suicide as a felony, and the
Beresford rule based thereon, would survive a close judicial inspection if made today. It is not known to what extent religious philosophy and doctrine shaped legal policy regarding suicide. Whatever
the extent, it is doubtful that the state church today supports holding suicide a felony as strongly as it did at early common law. The
Church of England recently set up a commission to consider a revision of English law on suicide. 13 It pointed out that the church has
not changed its point of view regarding the religious and moral
aspects of suicide, but considers softening its approach due to a
recognition of sociological and psychological factors unknown or
unappreciated in the past.
The dissolution of the feudal land system removed another of
the major factors which caused suicide to be regarded as a felony.
Today little more than reference to history will support the conclusion that suicide should be judged a felony in England.
III.

UNITED STATES

The United States did not follow the common law of England
concerning suicide. 14 This country never had a feudal or tenurial
land system attended with service obligations amounting to property rights. Further, separation of church and state precluded any
9 Ibid.
10 Id. at 236.
11 52 T.L.R. 650, [1937] 2 K.B.
12 4 Bligh (N.S.) 194, cited in
13 Christian Century, Sept. 21,
14 St. John-Stevas, supra note

197 (C.A.).
Life Insurance and Suicide, I Modern L. Rev.
1960, p. 1078.
2 at 241.

154, 155 (1937).
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explicit religious influence upon the legal attitude toward suicide.
Any religious influence would be implicit only to the extent that
a particular religious doctrine personally affected individual lawmakers. This influence might be felt at a certain state level, but
the lack of uniformity in religious thinking would dilute any influence at a national level.
Even if the social and historic structure in the United States
were identical with England, it is doubtful that we would have
followed England's policy on suicide. As pointed out above, England's position that suicide is a felony is based on historical perspective. Those reasons were mostly invalid at the time we were
called upon to establish a policy regarding suicide.
The great majority of states never regarded suicide as a felony; 15 therefore, they never enjoyed England's certainty in establishing a policy regarding suicide. There was no precedent for guidance. Consequently, public policy varied from state to state and
many diverse and conflicting cases appeared. The question was usually raised in relation to recovery on an insurance policy.
The United States Supreme Court attempted to establish a
uniform policy among the states in Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of N.Y. 16 There the court denied payment to the estate of the sane
suicide, stating that when the policy is silent regarding suicide,
there exists an implied condition that the suicide shall not precipitate the policy through self destruction. In dictum the court also
stated that the same result would obtain even if the parties contracted to pay in the event of suicide. The court felt that such an
agreement would encourage self destriuction and thus violate public
policy.
The Ritter rule was modified in Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Johnson.17 That case upheld Ritter regarding insurance contracts which were silent as to suicide, but overruled the dictum that
the parties could not contract to make suicide no defense to recovery on the policy. The Supreme Court held that individual state
public policy would determine whether the parties to the insurance
contract could agree to waive the defense of suicide on a life insurance policy.
A great majority of courts distinguish between life insurance
policies payable to the suicide's estate and those payable to third
party beneficiaries.' 8 The Ritter and Northwestern cases reflect the
hesitancy of the courts to allow payment of life insurance to estates
of suicides. The courts do, however, favor payment of the suicide's
life insurance if made to a third party beneficiary. 19 Some of the
reasons for this distinction are:
(1) At the time of the development of case law on this subject,
a third party beneficiary had a vested interest in the insurance
20
which could not be affected by an act in which he took no part.
This reason has little force today because most insurance contracts
have a provision for change of benefiicary, which destroys that
vested interest.
15
16
17
18
19
20

Ibid.
169 U.S. 139 (1897).
254 U.S. 96 (1920).
Steel v. Driver Salesmen's Union Local # 463, 147 Pa. Supp. 172, 24 A.2d 20 (1942).
Ibid.
Vance, Insurance 562 (3d ed. 1951).
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(2) Ordinarily, a person will not commit suicide to benefit a
third person as readily as to benefit his own estate. An exception
would seem to be where the insurance is payable to the insured's
spouse. In most cases the suicide would not distinguish between
payment to his wife and payment to his estate.
(3) Where possible, an insurance contract is resolved in favor
of the insured. 21 Insurance agreements are contracts of adhesion.
Such contracts lack the element of bilateral bargaining and the
law interprets any ambiguity or uncertainty against the party who
framed the contract. Since there is no compelling reason to prevent
payment of a suicide's insurance to a third party, the courts favor
payment. Payment to a third
party is denied only when the contract
22
so provides in clear terms.
The courts agree that suicide by an insane person is an accident 23 and is no defense to an action on a life insurance policy, in
absence of policy provision. However, a controversy arises over the
degree of insanity necessary to turn a suicide into an accident. A
discussion of the different standards applied is beyond the scope of
this paper, except to say that Colorado applies the same standard
of insanity as used in criminal cases. 24 When applied to life insurance, it creates the unique situation of using a criminal test of insanity in a civil proceeding upon an insurance policy.
Suicide is a defense to an action upon an insurance policy if the
insured contemplated suicide at the time of taking out the policy. 25
21
22
23
24
25

Steel v. Driver Salesmen's Union Local # 463, supra note 18.
Ibid.
McCowan v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., 116 Colo. 78, 179 P.2d 275 (1947).
London Guor & Acc. Co. v. Officer, 78 Colo. 441, 242 Pac. 989 (1926).
Steel v. Driver Salesmen's Union Local # 463, supro note 18.
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This is fraud and is outside the contemplation of the parties to the
contract.
The courts make no distinction regarding the motive of suicide
which arises after the policy is issued. Disposition of the policy is
made according to the rules set out above, with no regard to the
suicide's personal motives. It is much easier for courts to decide
according to class of beneficiaries than upon considerations of the
subjective thoughts of the suicide.
IV.

COLORADO STATUTES

Colorado attempted to eliminate much of the uncertainty and
ambiguity created by case law on the-subject of suicide and life
insurance by passing legislation on the matter. The first suicide/
insurance statute was passed in 1903.26 It provided, in essence, that
suicide by the policyholder of any life insurance contract made in
Colorado, whether sane or insane, voluntary or involuntary, shall
be no defense against an action upon the policy. The constitutionality of the statute was raised in Head Camp Woodmen of the World
v. Sloss. 27 The court upheld the statute and cited the United States
Supreme Court decision of Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. as authority.28 That case discussed the constitutionality of a Missouri
suicide/insurance statute similar to that of Colorado. The Missouri
statute differed from Colorado's in that it provided that suicide is
an absolute defense if it appears that the insured contemplated
suicide at the time of taking out the policy. The Colorado statute
had no such provision.
The Whitfield case is considered cornerstone authority on the
constitutionality of such statutes.
An insurance company is not bound to make a contract
which is attended by the results indicated by the statute
in question. If it does business at all in the state, it must do
so subject to such valid regulations as the state may choose
to adopt. Even if the statute in question could be fairly regarded by the court as inconsistent with public policy or
sound morality, it cannot for that reason be disregarded;
for it is the province of the state, by its legislature, to adopt
such a policy as it deems best, provided it does not, in so
doing, come into conflict with the constitution of the state
or the constitution
of the United States. There is no such
29
conflict here.
This decision primarily states a conclusion and gives little constitutional law by which to judge the validity of other suicide/
insurance statutes. The "take it or leave it" language is similar to
that used in other cases which point out that corporations do not
have the protection of privileges and immunities granted in the
Constitution. The use of the words "valid regulations" indicate that
the court recognized more than the privilege and immunity ques26 Colo. Sess. Laws 1903, ch. 119, § 1. Section 1: From and (after) the passage of this act the
suicide of a policyholder of any life insurance company doing business in this state shall not be a
defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or in.
voluntary, and whether said policy holder was sane or insane.
2749 Colo. 177, 112 Pac. 49 (19101.
28 205 U.S. 489 (1907).
29 Id- at 495.
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tion, but there is no explicit discussion. The Whitfield case is constitutional authority only to the extent that another statute may be
compared and identified with the one upheld in that case, but not
on the basis of any general principles expounded therein.
It is true that a state has the power to regulate insurance. It is
well established that insurance is affected with the public interest,30
which gives a state the power to regulate it through the proper
exercise of its police power. 31 The validity of the suicide/insurance
statute is measured by weighing the public interest of regulation
against the constitutional right of the parties to freely contract. The
balance lies at a speculative point on the subjective due process
scale.
The Head Camp case held the 1903 Colorado suicide statute
valid. However, Judge Gabbert, in a concurring opinion, issued a
caveat concerning the one point in which the Colorado statute
differed from the Missouri statute. He stated that the statute might
be unconstitutional because it made available no defense to the
insurer toward those who contemplate suicide in taking out a life
insurance policy. This point was not raised by the parties to the
litigation, therefore it was not resolved by the court.
In 1913 the Colorado legislature modified the suicide/insurance
statute, perhaps in response to Judge Gabbert's caveat. 32 However,
rather than specifically making suicide contemplated at the time of
taking out the policy an absolute defense, the statute made suicide,
sane or insane, voluntary or involuntary, a defense only within the
first policy year. It is not clear whether this one year proviso applies to suicides where the motive was formed before or after the
issuance of the policy. If it is interpreted as including suicides contemplated at time of issuing the policy, the question is raised whether one year is a reasonable safeguard to the insurer so as to eliminate the constitutional question raised in Judge Gabbert's caveat.
The legislature probably picked one year in recognition of the fact
that the great majority of suicides are the result of short term emotional motivation, and that it would be quite unusual for a person
to plan suicide more than one year in advance. If this is true for
the great majority of people, the statute would not be rendered
unconstitutional because there may be a few individuals who could
defraud the insurer by planning their death more than one year in
advance. The test of the validity of the provision is its reasonableness as33 applied to the great majority of the class to which it is
aimed.
The 1913 suicide/insurance statute was re-enacted
in the com34
piled laws of Colorado in 1921 with no change.
30 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. N.O. Nelson Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 352 (1934).
31 Osburn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
32 Colo. Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 99, § 59. Section 59. (providing that suicide shall not be a defense
against the payment of life insurance oolicy.)
From and after the passage of this act, the suicide of a policyholder after the first policy year,
of any life insurance company doing business in this State, shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary and whether said
policyholder was sane or insane.
33 Lamb v. Powder River Stock Co., 132 Fed. 434 (8th Cir. 1904).
34 Colo. Camp. Lows 1921, ch. 42, § 62. Section 62. (Providing that suicide shall not be a defense
against the payment of life insurance policy.)
From and after the passage of this act, the suicide of a policy-holder after the first policy year,
of any life insurance company doing business in this state, shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary, and whether said
policyholder was sane or insane.
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In 1933, the law of 1913 and 1921 was re-enacted subject to the
following amendment:
[P] rovided, however, that if there shall be a provision
in any such policy hereafter issued that additional insurance specifically against death by accident shall not be
payable if the death of the insured resulted from suicide
whether sane or insane, such provision shall be valid, but
the insurer shall be obligated to return, or pay, at least the
amount of the premiums paid on account of such insurance.8 5 (Emphasis added).
This was Colorado's first association of the suicide clause as applied
to an accidental death insurance policy. Its previous application
was limited strictly to life insurance policies.
Suicide by an insane person is universally recognized as an
accident. 36 Suicide by a sane person is not an accident. It is apparent
why the legislature would want to exempt the sane suicide from
recovery on an accidential death policy, since such death is not
accidental. It isn't one of the risks assured against or contemplatea
by the parties. However, suicide while insane is an accident and is
therefore the proper subject of accidental death insurance. It is difficult to understand why the legislature would preclude the defense
of suicide in life insurance but allow the insurer to contract away
35 Colo. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 113, § 2532.
36 McCowan v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., supra note 23.
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his liability to an insane suicide in an accidental death policy. The
suicide/insurance statute reflects Colorado public policy and therefore should not be narrowly construed. Equally well, it should not
be arbitrarily applied where no good reason supports the distinction.
Apparently the legislature did not recognize that an insane
suicide is an accident. Their purpose in the 1933 amendment probably was to rid accidental death policies of the burden of paying
the claims of sane suicides and, in so doing, inadvertantly excluded
the insane suicide also. No other explanation presents itself.
That part of the 1933 amendment calling for return of premiums implies an unawareness of the nature of insurance coverage.
One source of authority states that the company must return the
37
premiums paid on a policy when suicide is raised as a defense.
Another source claims that the company is under no obligation to
return the premiums. 38 Neither position is supported by good reason. Where suicide is a valid defense, the insured suicide has been
receiving coverage under the terms of the policy up to the time of
his death. For that time he represented a risk and potential liability
to the insurer. For that time he was protected and received that
for which he bargained. To compel repayment of premiums, as
suggested by the statute, would cause insurers to provide protection
for suicides at no compensation. It can be argued that the real and
actual expense and liability of an insurer is actual payment of a
claim. Further, the statute contemplates a situation where payment
is nevermade, therefore it would be inequitable to allow the insurer to retain the premiums received up to the time of the suicide.
This argument is fallacious and would support a demand for return
of premiums on every expired term insurance contract where the
risk did not mature. Such a proposition would be absurd and points
out that the service of insurance is the assumption of risk and protection given, not actual cash outlay. The most equitable remedy
is to pro-rate and return to the insured that portion of the premium
insuring him beyond the date of his suicide, less proper expenses
to the company. After all, the suicide breached the contract and the
company should suffer no loss.
The legislature, probably in recognition of the pitfalls of the
1933 law, amended the suicide/insurance statute in the Colorado
session laws of 1935. 39 It abolished the need for return of premiums
by the insurer for policies where suicide is a valid defense, and
eliminated all consideration of accidental death policies. The 1935
session law, although far from perfect, was the most accurate and
trouble free suicide/insurance statute Colorado has passed.
For its finale, the legislature modified the 1935 session law
when reproduced in the annotated Colorado statutes of 1935, just
enough to raise another constitutional question. Actually, there was
no change except that it did not begin with the usual language
37 Mehr & Cammack, Principles of Insurance 521 (Rev. ed. 1957).
38 St. John-Stevas, supra note 2 at 236.
3.9 Colo. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 136, § 2532. Section 2532. From and after the passage of this Act,
the suicide of a policyholder after the first policy year, of any life insurance company doing business
in this state, shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said
suicide was voluntary or involuntary, and whether said policyholder was sane or insane, providing,
however, that nothing in this act contained is intended or shall be construed to apply to any accident
insurance policy insuring against accidental death or death by accidental means, or to those parts or
provisions of any life insurance policy which insure specifically against accidental death or death
by accidental means.
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"From and after the passage of this act. ' 40 It was couched in terms
indicating that it encompassed all life insurance contracts made in
this state, including those made prior to the passage of the statute.
In so doing it came into conflict with Article 1, Section 10 of the
United States Constitution, which prohibits a state from impairing
the obligation of a contract. The legislature was bailed out by the
Colorado Supreme Court in the case of McCowan v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y of the U.S.,4 1 where the court said that all legislation
is presumed to be prospective unless the plain language of the act
dictates otherwise. The court decided that the act was not retroactive and avoided a constitutional conflict.
The statute, as it appeared in the 1935 Colorado statutes annotated, was re-enacted in the Colorado revised statutes of 1953
without change and stands on the books today.
V.

SUGGESTIONS

For the reasons pointed out in this discussion, the Colorado
suicide statute should be extended to include insane suicides under
accidental death policies. In addition the language of the statute
should be changed from "suicide of the policyholder" to "suicide of
the insured." The present language creates a gap in those situations
in which the insured and the policyholder are different persons.
Most life insurance policies, which have incorporated the suicide/
insurance statute into the policy, have substituted the word "insured" for "policyholder." This change would simply expand the
statute into conformity with the existing situation and would eliminate a needless gap.
40 Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 87, § 76 (1935). The sucide of a policyholder after the first policy year,
of any life insurance company doing business in this state, shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said policyholder was sane or insane, providing, however,
that nothing in this law contained is intended or shall be construed to apply to any accident insurance
policy insuring against accidental death or death by accidental means, or to those parts or provisions
of any life insurance policy which insure specifically against accidental death or death by accidental means.
41 Supro note 23.
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